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OPTIMAL AWARDS AND PENALTIES WHEN
THE PROBABILITY OF PREVAILING
VARIES AMONG PLAINTIFFS
ABSTRACT
This article derives the optimal award to a winning plaintiff and the optimal penalty on
a losing plaintiff when the probability of prevailing varies among plaintiffs. Optimality is
defined in terms of achieving a specified degree of deterrence of potential injurers with the
lowest litigation cost. Our main result is that the optimal penalty on a losing plaintiff is positive,
in contrast to common practice in the United States. By penalizing losing plaintiffs and raising
the award to winning plaintiffs (relative to what it would be if losing plaintiffs were not
penalized), it is possible to discourage relatively low-probability-of-prevailing plaintiffs from
suing without discouraging relatively high-probability plaintiffs, and thereby to achieve the
desired degree of deterrence with lower litigation costs. This result is developed first in a model
in which all Suits are assumed to go to trial and then in a model in which settlements are
possible.
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and NBER1. Introduction
This article derives the optimal award to a winning plaintiff and the
optimal penalty on a losing plaintiff when the probability of prevailing
varies among plaintiffs. Optimality is defined in terms of achieving a
specified degree of deterrence of potential injurers with the lowest
litigation cost. Our main result is that the optimal penalty on a losing
plaintiff is positive, in contrast to common practice in the United States.
This result is developed first in s model in which all suits are assumed to go
to trial (Section 2) and then in a model in which settlements are possible
(Section 3). We conclude with some observations about two related
topics --theBritish rule for allocating litigation costs and Becker's theory
of public enforcement (Section 4))
The essence of our argument is that if losing plaintiffs are not
penalized, then it is possible to impose a penalty and raise the award so as
to reduce the value of suits for relatively low-probability-of-prevailing
plaintiffs while at the same time increase the value of suits for relatively
high-probability-of-prevailing plaintiffs. This is feasible because, by
definition, low-probability plaintiffs have a lower probability of winning at
trial, or equivalently, a higher probability of losing, than high-probability
plaintiffs. As a result, imposing e penalty will dissdvantsge low-probability
plaintiffs more than high-probability plaintiffs, while rsising the award will
Our article is the first to demonstrate the desirability of a general
policy of imposing a penalty on s plaintiff if he loses. Of related interest,
however, are srticles that evaluate alternative rules for allocating
litigation costs, including making a losing plaintiff psy the defendant's
legal fees. For two recent exsmples, see Grsvelle (1993) and Bebchuk and
Chang (1992).(We show in Section 4 that the optimal penalty may differ
substantially from the defendant's legal fees.) Also of interest are srticles
that consider the use of penalties to control frivolous suits. See, for
example, Katz (1990, pp. 19-20) and Polinsky and Rubinfeld (1993).
-1-benefit high-probability plaintiffa more than low-probability plaintiffs.
Reducing the value of suits for low-probability plaintiffs will cause fewer of
them to sue, thereby saving litigation costs, while raising the value of suits
for high-probability plaintiffs increases the defendant's expected payment,
thereby allowing deterrence to be maintained.
2. The Basic Analysis
A risk-neutrsl injurer engages in conduct that causes harm to one of a
number of risk-neutral potential victims.(We will use the terms "injurer"
and "defendant" interchangeably, and similarly for "victim" and "plaintiff.")
The probability of prevailing at trial varies among potential victims.2 Each
one knows his probability of prevailing, but the injurer knows only the
distribution of the probabilities among potential plaintiffs.
In the basic analysis, all suits are assumed to go to trial. If the
plaintiff wins, he receives an award from the defendant. If the plaintiff
loses, he pays a penalty to the defendant. Each side hears its own trial
costs.
The following notation will be used:
p =probabilitythat the plaintiff will prevail at trial;
f(p) —densityof p among potential plaintiffs;
x —awardpaid to the plsintiff from the defendant if the
plaintiff prevails at trial (x ￿ 0);
2 The probability might vary because plaintiffs differ in their ability
to marshall evidence about issues relating to causality or fault. In products
liability cases, for example, some victims may have kept packing material or a
receipt as proof of purchase, while others may not have. In accident cases,
evidence about fault sometimes may be destroyed and sometimes may not be.
-2-y —penaltypaid by the plaintiff to the defendant if the
plaintiff loses at trial (y ￿ 0);
c, —plaintiff'strial coat; and
td —defendant'strial coat.
The population of potential plaintiffs is normalized to be unity.
A victim will file a suit if the expected value of the trial outcome
exceeds his trial coat. Let
V(p, x, y) —expectedvalue to a plaintiff of the trial outcome
exclusive of hia trial coat, given p, x, and y.
Note thar
V(p, x, y) —px
.(1-p)y. (1)
We assume that x > c. so that if the probability of prevailing ia
sufficiently high, a victim will bring a auit (otherwise a victim would not
sue even if he were certain to win). Alao, if the probability of prevailing
is low enough, a victim will not find it worthwhile to aue. Let
(x, y) —valueof the probability of prevailing below which
a victim will not sue and above which he will aue,3




(x, y) —(y+c)/(x+y)c 1, (3)
where the inequality follows from the aaaumption that x > cp. We will refer
to (x, y) as the "critical probability of prevailing."
The extent to which the defendant is deterred ia determined by his
We aaausae without baa of generality that a victim will not sue if
p -(x,y).expected payment to the plaintiff plus his trial cost. Let
D(x, y) level of deterrence achieved given x and y,
and observe that
1
D(x, y) —f[V(p,x, y) + cd]f(p)dp. (4)
p
Also, let
L(x, y) —levelof litigation costs given x and y,
and note that
1
L(x, y) —f(c+ cd)f(p)dp. (5)
p
In general, social welfare includes the gain to the defendant from
engaging in the harmful conduct, the harm to the plaintiff, and the litigation
costs borne by both parties. For our purposes, however, it is not necessary
to derive the optimal award and penalty from the maximization of social
welfare. We simply want to show that if the award is positive and the penalty
is zero, it always is possible to increase social welfare by raising both the
award and the penalty. We will do this by demonstrating that a higher award
and penalty combination can be choaen that achieves the same degree of
deterrence of the defendant -- andtherefore the same gain to the defendant
and the same harm to the plaintiff --butdoes so with lower litigation costs.
To be precise, if x' is any award when the penalty, y, is zero, we will
show that there exists an x" > x' and a y" > 0 such that D(x", y") —D(x',0)
and L(x", y") < L(x', 0).
As a preliminary matter, let 'bethe initial value of the critical
probability of prevailing (the value when x —x'and y —0):
—(x',0)—c/x'
. (6)





8y construction, (x, y(x)) '.Inother words, for every combinstion of x
snd y(x), the value of the critical probability of prevailing is the same as
the initial value. Hence, litigation costs are the same with x and y(x) as
with x' and no penalty.
If x —c/'
,thenfrom (6), x —x',andfrom (7), y(x)0; in other
words, starting with x equal to c/' is equivalent to starting with x' and no
penalty. Now substitute y(x) for y in V(p, x, y) to get, using (1),




It is clear from (8) that for all p >' , Vis strictly increasing in x.
Thus, if x is raised above c/' ,sayto some x", and the penalty is set equal
to y(x"), then V(p, x", y(x")) >V(p,x' ,0)for all p >' . Sincethe
critical probability of prevailing remains at ', itfollows from (4) that
deterrence will have risen above the initial level --thatis,
D(x", y(x")) >D(x',0).Note also that y(x") >0since, from (7), y(x) is
strictly increasing in x.
To restore deterrence to the initial level, keep x equal to C and raise
y above y(x"), to some y", until deterrence falls to D(x' ,0).That
deterrence declines as the penalty rises is clear since V is strictly
decreasing in y and fi is strictly incressing in y.5 Moreover, as y —
V-.- forall p <1and -,1,implying that deterrence must approach zero
To focus on the logic of the argument, we ignore constraints (such as
the defendant's or the plaintiff's wealth or considerations of fairness) that
might prevent the award or the penalty from being raised to the desired level.
It is obvious from (1) that V is strictly decreasing in y. From (3)
3/3y —(x-c)/(x+y)2>0.(essentially no one sues). Thus, assuming continuity, there exists a y" >
y(x") > 0 such that D(x", y") —D(x',0).And sinceis strictly increasing
in y, L(x", y") C L(x' ,0).This establishes the desired result.6
The reason it is possible to raise the award and the penalty so as to
discoursge suits without reducing deterrence is, in essence, because potential
plaintiffs whose probability of prevailing is sufficiently high are favorably
affected by these changes, while potential plaintiffs whose probability is
relatively low are adversely affected. The former group benefits because the
expected value of the incresse in the award more than offsets the expected
value of the increase in the penalty; the latter group suffers for the
opposite reason. It is the detrimental effect on the latter group that causes
fewer suits to be brought, while the beneficial effect on the former group
allows deterrence to be maintained.
To appreciate the advantage of imposing a penalty on losing plaintiffs,
consider the following numerical example. Let there be two potential
plaintiffs, one with a probability of prevailing of 0.3 and the other with a
probability of 0.8. Each is equally likely to be injured. If a suit is
filed, both the plaintiff and the defendant incur $20,000 in trial costs.
Suppose initially that the award to a winning plaintiff is $100,000 and that
there is no penalty imposed on a losing plaintiff. Given these values, both
the low-probability and the high-probability plaintiff will sue if injured,
the level of deterrence achieved against the defendant is $75,000, and
6 It should be clear from the structure of this argument that social
welfare can be increased by raising the award and the penalty starting from
jjawardand penalty combination. We started with a positive award and a
penalty of zero because this most closely reflects the conventional practice
in the United States.
-6-litigation costs sre $40,000. It is easily shown that raising the award to
a winning plaintiff from $100,000 to $174,000 and imposing a penalty of
$46,000 on a losing plaintiff will lead only the high-probability plaintiff to
sue, will achieve the same level of deterrence against the defendant, and will
reduce litigation costs by half, to $20,000.
3. Settlements
This section extends the analysis of the previous section to a model in
which settlements are possible.
The following sequence of events is assumed to occur. First, the victim
decides whether to file a suit. Second, if a suit is filed, the defendant
makes a single take-it-or-leave-it settlement offer (a refusal to settle
corresponds to an offer of zero).9 Third, the plaintiff decides whether to
accept the defendant's offer or to go to trial.
Let
The low-probability plaintiff will sue because .3 x $100,000 —$30,000
>$20,000;the high-probability plaintiff has an even stronger motive to sue.
The level of deterrence achieved against the defendant is .5[(.3 x $100,000) +
$20,000]+.5[(.8x $100,000) +$20,000]—$75,000.Litigation costs are
$40,000 (the sum of the plaintiff's and the defendant's trial costs) because a
suit will result whenever harm occurs.
The low-probability plaintiff now will be indifferent between suing and
not suing because (.3 x $174,000) -(.7x $46,000) —$20,000(the penalty
could be raised by a dollar to make him strictly prefer to not sue). The
high-probability plaintiff obviously then will have a positive motive to sue.
The level of deterrence achieved against the defendant is .5](.8 x $174,000) -
(.2x $46,000) +$20,000]—$75,000.Litigation costs now are .5 x $40,000 —
$20,000.
We assume that the defendant (the uninformed party) makes a settlement
offer in order to avoid the "signalling" complications that would arise if the
plaintiff (the informed party) made a settlement demand -- themagnitude of
the demand might convey information to the defendant about the plaintiff's
type.s —settlementoffer of the defendsnt.
For notational simplicity, we will not indicste explicitly thst the
defendant's choice of s depends on x and y. Since a plaintiff whose
probability of prevailing equals unity would obtain s net benefit of x -c
from going to trial, and all other plaintiffs would obtain less, this is the
highest settlement offer the defendant would make. Thus,
0 ￿ s ￿ x -cp. (9)
We assume for simplicity that it is costless to file a suit.
Consequently, a victim will file a suit regardless of his probability of
prevailing at trial since if the defendant offers any positive settlement,
filing a suit and accepting the settlement offer is preferable to not filing
the suit.
If the plaintiff accepts the defendant's offer, he obtains 5;ifhe
rejects it, his expected payoff at trial is px -(1-p)y
-c.Obviously, if
p is low enough, the plaintiff will accept the settlement offer. Let
(x, y) —valueof the probability of prevailing below which
a plaintiff will accept the settlement offer and
above which he will go to trial,




(x, y) —(s+y+c)/(x+y)￿ 1; (11)
the inequality follows from (9). We will refer to (x, y) as the "critical
probability of prevailing."0
Although this phrase was used to refer toin Section 2, it is
employed here as well sinceplays an analogous role andwill not be
referred to in Section 3.
-8-Given the defendant's choice of the settlement offer, the level of
deterrence achieved is
1
D(x, y) —J'sf(p)dp+ f[v(p, x, y) + cdJf(p)dp, (12)
0
and litigation costs are
1
L(x, y) —f(c+ cd)f(p)dp. (13)
p
As in Section 2, we will show that if x' is any award when the penalty
is zero, there exists an x" > x' and a y" >0 such that D(x", y") —D(x',0)
and L(x", y") C L(x' ,0).Thisresult is more difficult to demonstrate here
because deterrence results in part from settlement payments and the
defendant's choice of a changes as x and y change. The structure of the
proof, however, parallels that in Section 2.
Let a' be the settlement offer chosen by the defendant when the award is
x' and there is no penalty. We assume that
s' C x' -c; (14)
otherwise (if a' —x'-cr),all plaintiffs would accept the settlement offer
initially and it would be impossible to lower litigation costs further.
Let j'bethe initial value of the critical probability of prevailing:
—(x',0)—(s'+ c)/x' C 1, (15)
where the inequality follows from (14).




It is easy to verify that
(x, y(x)) —' +[(1 - ')/(x - c)}s ￿ '. (17)
Thus, for every x and y(x), the value of the critical probability ofprevailing is no less than the initial value.
We will next show that there exists an x" > x' and a y(x") > 0 such that
D(x", y(x")) > D(x' ,0).Starting from x —c/'
,inwhich case y(x) —0,let
x grow without bound. First suppose that (x, y(x)) •1as x • then it
must be that a -.m aswell (otherwise, from (17), it is clear thatwould
approach 'C1.). Therefore, the first integral in (12) increases without
bound, implying that there exists an C > x' such that D(x", y(x")) >
D(x' ,0);and since y(x) is increasing in x, clearly y(x") > 0.
Alternatively, ifdoes not approach unity as x -', thenthere exists
an E>0 and some arbitrarily large x, say x*, such that y(x)) C 1 -
Since
V(p, x, y(x)) —[(p
-')x+ (1 -p)c]/(l
-') (18)
grows without bound in x for all p > ', itfollows that the second integral
in (12) can be made arbitrarily large." Hence, again there exists an
x" > x' such that D(x", y(x")) > 0(x' ,0)and y(x") > 0.
Next, keeping x equal to x", raise y above y(x") until deterrence falls
to D(x' ,0).Tosee that this can be done, first note that aa y -,, V-.-
forall p C 1 and •1.This implies that if y is high enough, the defendant
will chooae a —0.For if a positive a is chosen, the defendant's coats are
at least s (everyone will file suit and at a minimum collect the settlement
offer), whereas if s —0, the defendant's costs approach zero as y -,(since
the probability of suit goes to zero and the coat to the defendant of being
sued declines with y). Hence, deterrence must approach zero as y •
implying(assuming continuity) that there exists a y" > y(x") > 0 such that
That p > 'overthe range of integration in the second integral in
(12) follows from (17).
10 -D(x", y") D(x' ,0).
Finally, it remains to be ahown that litigation costa fall. First
observe from (11) that (x, y) can be written as
(x, y) —[s/(x+y)]+[(y+c)/(x+y)}. (19)
By construction, for every x and y(x) combination, the second term in brackets
equals f'(see(16)). Since this term is strictly increasing in y, when x was
held constant at x" and y was raised from y(x") to y", the second term
increased above '.Moreover,the first term in brackets is non-negative.
Thus, (x", y") >T',whichimplies that L(x", y") <L(x',0)and completes
the proof.
Although the analysis in this section is more complicated because of the
possibility of settlements, the underlying intuition is similar to that
discussed previously. Raising the award and the penalty benefits plaintiffs
whose probability of prevailing is relatively high and disadvantages
plaintiffs whose probability is relatively low. In Section 2 this had the
effect of discouraging individuals in the latter group from filing suit,
whereas here it discourages them from going to trial. In both instances,
litigation costs fall as a consequence. Deterrence can be maintained, in
Section 2 as well as here, because the expected value of the trial outcome is
enhanced for the relatively high-probability-of-prevailing plaintiffs.
4. Concludins Remarks
Thia section explains how our analysis of optimal awards and penalties
relatea to the British rule for allocating litigation coats and to Becker's
theory of public enforcement.
-11-(a) The British rule for allocating litigation costs. We assumed that
each side paid for its own trial costs regardless of the outcome of the
trial --apractice commonly referred to as the American rule. An alternative
is the British rule, under which the loser pays the winners litigation coats.
One could view a switch from the American rule to the British rule as a
way of implementing the type of changes suggested in this article. Relative
to the American rule, the British rule in effect increases the award to a
winning plaintiff --bythe amount of the plaintiff's litigation costs -- and
also imposes a penalty on a losing plaintiff --equalto the defendant's
litigation coats. Thus, if the award otherwise cannot be varied and if the
penalty otherwise would be zero, the British rule might be superior to the
American rule for the reasons we discuss.
It is important to note, however, that neither the implicit award nor
the implicit penalty under the British rule necessarily correspond closely to
the optimal award and penalty. This can be seen in the numerical example.
Recall that the plaintiff and the defendant each incurred trial costs of
$20,000. The award to a winning plaintiff was assumed to be $100,000 when
there was no penalty imposed on a losing plaintiff. Switching to the British
rule would in effect raise the award to a winning plaintiff to $120,000 and
impose a penalty of $20,000 on a losing plaintiff. Recall, however, that the
optimal award was $174,000 and the optimal penalty was $46,000. Thus, in this
example the optimal increase in the award is nearly four times the plaintiff's
litigation costs and the optimal penalty is more than twice the defendant's
litigation costs.12
2 Moreover, it is easily shown in this example that the implicit
adjustments to the award and penalty under the British rule would not be
enough to discourage low-probability plaintiffs from suing, whereas the
-12-(b) Becker's theory of public enforcement. Our analysis of optimal
awards and penalties in private litigation has an obvious parallel to Becker's
(1968) theory of optimal public enforcement. Becker showed that a higher fine
allows the probability of detection to be lowered without sacrificing
deterrence; enforcement costs are ssved as s consequence. In privste
litigation, we have shown that a higher award and penalty can lead to a lower
probability of suit or of trial without compromising deterrence; litigation
costs are saved as a result. In both contexts, therefore, the sanction is
raised, the probability of its imposition falls, and administrative costs are
reduced.
It is well known that a logical implication of Becker's theory is that
fines should be as high as possible and the probability of detection should be
correspondingly low. Similarly, the logic of our analysis suggesta that the
award and the penalty should be as high as possible so that the probability of
suit or of trial falls substantially.
Becker's theory has been criticized on the grounds that severe fines,
pdtentially as high as an individual's wealth, hardly ever are imposed. An
analogous criticism could be leveled against the implicationa of our analysis.
In both contexts, however, there are additional considerations --suchas
fairness or risk-bearing costs --that,if taken into account, would lead to
the conclusion that the optimal fine or the optimal award or penalty is not as
high as possible.
optimal award and penalty would deter such suits.
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